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Scouting, Signaling, and Gatekeeping
Chinese Naval Operations in Japanese Waters and the
International Law Implications

I

n October 2008, a month after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan stepped down and
the more hawkish Taro Aso took office, a Chinese flotilla of four People’s Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN) ships transited from west to east through Japan’s narrow Tsugaru
1
Strait en route to the Pacific Ocean. The vessels were observed together in the Sea of Japan, headed east toward the strait, by a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) P-3C
patrol aircraft; they were about twenty-five nautical miles west-southwest of Tappizaki,
the cape at the northern tip of the Tsugaru Peninsula, where the Sea of Japan enters the
Tsugaru Strait between the islands of Honshu and Hokkaido. The flotilla consisted of a
Sovremennyy-class missile destroyer—one of four China bought from Russia between
1996 and 2002—a supply ship, and two Jiangkai frigates, one of which was a newly com2
missioned Jiangkai II. Apparently the Sovremennyy and one of the frigates had recently
“paid a friendly visit to a naval base in the Russian Far East” before joining the other two
Chinese naval vessels in the Sea of Japan and proceeding on through the strait to the Pa3
cific Ocean (see figure 1).
The Jiangkai II is the newest and one of the most advanced surface combatants in the
Chinese fleet, with a vertical launch system, C-802 surface-to-surface missiles, and the
4
capacity to employ advanced Yu-6 and -7 torpedoes. Although Chinese navy ships and
submarines have occasionally transited Japanese straits in the past, this appears to have
been the first instance of an armed surface combatant passing between two of Japan’s
5
main islands. Almost immediately, the Japanese Ministry of Defense began analyzing
“the real purpose of their activity,” but it acknowledged that despite the close passage of
the PLAN warships to Japanese shores, as they made passage through the Tsugaru Strait
the Chinese vessels had remained in “international waters and . . . did not infringe
6
upon Japan’s territorial waters.” Thus, although perhaps politically and militarily troubling, the passage was entirely lawful in terms of international law of the sea and
Japan’s domestic law.
The Tsugaru Strait is a narrow choke point between the Sea of Japan and the Pacific
Ocean; it is roughly eight nautical miles wide at its narrowest point, between the
islands of Hokkaido to the north and Honshu to the south. It is one of only five straits
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Figure 1. The two groups of ships joined west of Honshu in the Sea of Japan before heading
east for the Tsugaru Strait transit.
Source: Strong Country Forum (Qiang Guo Luntan), a popular Web forum managed by the People’s Daily
On-Line.
Notes:
11 October: Group 1, consisting of a Chinese Sovremennyy-class destroyer (hull 138) and a Jiangkai-class
frigate (hull 525), departed Zhoushan Naval Base, location of China’s East Sea Fleet Headquarters, bound for
Vladivostok.
14 October: Group 1 arrived in Vladivostok.
16 October: Group 2, consisting of a Jiangkai II frigate (hull 529) and an unidentified supply ship, is believed
to have departed Zhoushan Naval Base heading north from the East China Sea to the Sea of Japan.
17 October: The Group 2 ships were reported sighted by a JMSDF ASW aircraft in the Strait of Tsushima.
18 October: The Group 1 ships departed Vladivostok. The two groups met in the Sea of Japan sometime
during the night of 18 October or early morning of 19 October.
19 October: At approximately 5:00 PM local time, the four ships were observed by a JMSDF ASW aircraft in
the Tsugaru Strait.

SCOUTING, SIGNALING, AND GATEKEEPING

3

among its many islands that Japan recognizes as international straits under the terms
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Part III, “Straits
7
Used for International Navigation.” Normally, since Japan is a party to UNCLOS, this
would mean that Japan must allow the right of transit passage through its straits to all
vessels in their normal mode of operation, including the warships of other states, even
states such as China, with which its military and political relations can at times be
tense. Under transit passage rules, even though the waters of a strait are within the territorial sea, submarines may pass through the strait submerged and aircraft may overfly
the strait without coastal-state permission. In other parts of a coastal state’s territorial
8
seas, the more restrictive rules of innocent passage apply.
However, this flotilla’s movement through the narrow waters between two of Japan’s
main islands was not a case of transit passage. Nor was it a case of innocent passage,
because under its territorial-sea law Japan had chosen not to enclose this strait within
9
its sovereign waters, although the strait is certainly narrow enough to have done so.
UNCLOS allows coastal states to claim territorial seas up to twelve nautical miles in
breadth. Some states claim lesser waters, for reasons of their own, as did Japan in the
Tsugaru Strait (see figure 2). By claiming less than the full twelve nautical mile sea from
each shore, Japan left in the Tsugaru Strait what is often referred to as a “high seas cor10
ridor” about three nautical miles wide. Technically, the narrow corridor of waters is
11
not part of the high seas, since it is covered by Japan’s exclusive economic zone. Nonetheless, since under UNCLOS, high-seas navigational and overflight freedoms apply in
the exclusive economic zone, the shorthand reference to the narrow lane in the channel
in the Tsugaru Strait as a “high seas corridor” points to the freedoms of navigation that
international law affords all ships, including warships, in this narrow belt and the fact
that the aircraft of all states are also free to overfly the waters of the corridor in the
strait.
The flotilla’s passage through the Tsugaru Strait was not the first passage of Chinese
navy vessels through Japanese straits in recent years. The first observed passage
occurred in May 2000, when a Yanbing-class Chinese icebreaker and intelligencegathering ship, capable of mapping the seabed, passed through the Tsushima and
12
Tsugaru straits on its way to open waters in the Pacific. As the first-ever transit of a
PLAN warship through Japanese straits, and presumably also because the PLAN vessel
was intelligence-capable, it was shadowed by a JMSDF P-3C aircraft and a surface
escort, the Sawayuki (DD 125), a Hatsuyuki-class destroyer. The Japanese Defense
Agency released a statement about the incident that acknowledged that the Tsugaru
Strait is “an international strait, through which any foreign ships can pass,” but also
noted that the event “seems to aim to demonstrate that the PRC Navy is becoming a
13
blue water navy from a brown water one.”
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Also, in November 2003 a Japanese P-3C observed a Ming-class submarine transiting
due west as it exited the Osumi Strait between southern Japan’s Kyushu and Tanega
islands, the latter a particularly sensitive area, since it is home to the Japanese space
center and rocket launch site from which Japan has over the years launched its intelli14
gence satellites (see figure 2). On this occasion, however, the Chinese submarine was
reportedly on scene to perform surveillance of a joint American-Japanese exercise in
the waters off Kyushu Island; a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
said that the vessel was performing “normal training” and denied that its presence
posed a threat to Japan. Additionally, all sides agreed that the Ming’s passage through
15
the Osumi Strait was both lawful and lawfully conducted.
In stark contrast to the lawfulness of these incidents, however, stands the 2004 passage
of a Chinese Han-class nuclear-powered attack submarine through the Ishigaki Strait
in Japan’s southern Ryukyu island chain, close to the island of Taiwan. During the early
morning hours of 10 November 2004, a Han entered Japanese territorial waters while
submerged, at approximately one hundred meters, and remained for about two hours
16
before exiting into international waters. Moving from south to north, the submarine
passed through the Ishigaki Strait, which separates the islands of Ishigaki and Miyako
at the southwestern edge of Japan’s Sakishima island chain, on its return from an operating area in the Philippine Sea to its home port near Qingdao, on China’s Shandong
17
Peninsula.
While the submarine was still operating well south of Japanese waters, the JMSDF,
apparently informed of its presence by U.S. Navy intelligence sources, began passive
18
tracking of the submarine and monitoring its activities. The Japanese continued to
monitor the Han passively as it operated outside Japan’s territorial sea south of Ishigaki
Island, but when the submarine turned north toward Japanese waters the JMSDF aircraft switched to active sonar—which uses echoes from an emitted signal to provide
trackers with a more precise location of their target.
As a result of the sub’s incursion, the JMSDF was put on an unusually high-level alert
by order of the Defense Agency director, General Yoshinori Ono, for only the second
19
time since the end of World War II. The JMSDF maintained track of the Han as it
passed through the strait and, once the alert order was issued, began more aggressive
tracking after the submarine’s exit from Japan’s territorial sea and until it had passed
20
well beyond the Japanese coastline. During this period the JMSDF tracked the submarine for more than two days with P-3C patrol planes, AWACS aircraft, antisubmarine
21
warfare (ASW) destroyers, and SH-60J helicopters.
The Han incident was not the first (or last) incursion to cause the JMSDF to exercise its
submarine-hunting and -tracking capabilities. Over the past decade, the Japanese have
observed more frequent submarine operations activities in the western and northern

Source: Limits in the Seas: No. 120, Straight Baselines and Territorial Sea Claims: Japan.

Figure 2. The Osumi Strait runs between the islands of Kyushu and Tanega.
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reaches of the East China Sea by China’s increasingly capable submarine force. As
recently as October 2008, for instance, several news reports and abundant Internet
chatter reported that the JMSDF had detected two Chinese submarines—a Han and a
Song—waiting for the aircraft carrier USS George Washington, newly based in Japan as
the replacement for the USS Kitty Hawk, as it transited from its home port at Yokosuka
22
Naval Base near Tokyo en route to a routine port visit in Pusan, South Korea. Reportedly the Chinese submarines remained outside Japanese territorial waters, but reports
also suggest that the missions of the PLAN vessels may have been to gather intelligence
on the acoustic and electronic signatures of the carrier and to signal China’s keen inter23
est in American naval presence in the region. Perhaps the Han, relatively noisy and
certain to be detected, accompanied the quieter, diesel-driven Song attack submarine to
make sure this strategic signal was received. In any case, these operations appear to
have been designed to detect and monitor American fleet movements from Japanese
bases, and perhaps to remind the United States and Japan of the increasing strength of
24
China’s submarine-borne antiaccess capabilities.
Each of China’s naval activities discussed above appears to have had intelligence collection or political signaling as a core purpose (see table 1), but a key difference between
most Chinese naval operations and the Han’s passage though the Ishigaki Strait is that
the Han clearly passed submerged through an area of Japanese territorial seas in which
both the Chinese and Japanese perspectives on international law of the sea appear to
agree that, in order to pass lawfully, submarines must be on the surface and flying their
flag—if they pass at all. In the remaining cases of Chinese naval activity in Japanese
straits, the existence of a corridor in which high seas freedoms apply provides a channel
that the vessels of all states may pass through in whatever mode they desire. Thus,
whereas both the Japanese and Chinese governments viewed the 2004 submerged passage of the Han through the Ishigaki Strait as a violation of coastal-state rights, all parties agree that the passage of ships and submarines through the “high seas corridor”
routes in the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Osumi straits were fully in compliance with international law—even if those ships were accompanied by a submerged submarine.
Chinese surface and submarine fleet activities in Japanese waters over the last decade
suggest that China is maximizing its use of lawful operations—and even some operations that it appears to view as contrary to international law—to send strategic messages, to scout avenues for operations in the Pacific Ocean, and perhaps to find
methods to control access to the littoral waters of East Asia during times of crisis.
Accordingly, this study examines the current state of the Chinese submarine fleet and
looks through the lens of international law at recent Chinese naval activities—primarily submarine—in and around the Japanese Archipelago. The study places special
emphasis on legal analysis of the 2004 passage of a Chinese Han-class submarine on an

Passes through Tsushima and Tsugaru straits

Passes through the Osumi Strait on the surface and flies the PRC
flag
Passes submerged through the Ishigaki Strait

Surfaces within torpedo range of USS Kitty Hawk during exercises
in the Pacific east of the Japan
Passes submerged in Japanese territorial sea in the vicinity of
Shikoku and Kyushu islands
Sit submerged in Japanese exclusive economic zone as USS
George Washington passes en route to Pusan

Confirmed: Yanbing icebreaker/
intelligence-collection vessel
Confirmed: Ming-class diesel attack
submarine
Confirmed: Han-class nuclear attack
submarine
Confirmed: Song-class diesel attack
submarine
Unconfirmed: PLAN submarine, unknown class
Unconfirmed: Han- and Song-class
attack submarines

May 2000

Nov. 2003

Nov. 2004

Oct. 2006

Sept. 2008

Oct. 2008

Table 1. Chinese submarine and surface combatant activities in the vicinity of Japanese islands. Confirmed status means that multiple, independent
open-source reports confirm the occurence of the event.

Activity

Ship/Submarine Class

Date
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underwater excursion through the Ishigaki Strait as the counterexample to Chinese
operations that appear largely to have been planned to ensure consistency with international law, in order to assess the importance of the November 2004 event in the overall
scheme of China’s regional operations and to draw conclusions about the impact of
this event on international law.

The Chinese Submarine Fleet
To understand the natures and purposes of Chinese submarine operations and the
messages they may be intended to convey, a brief survey of the status of the Chinese
submarine force is in order. Between 1995 and 2008, the PLAN commissioned approximately thirty-eight new submarines into service, an average of 2.9 submarines per year,
leaving the Chinese navy flush with a concentrated, modernized submarine fighting
25
force estimated at approximately sixty-four vessels. This substantial force is focused
largely on missions related to the defense of China’s own coastline and the denial of
access to U.S. naval strike groups and the warships of other navies that might seek to
26
intervene in a regional military crisis.
Of particular concern to these latter navies is China’s increasingly lethal fleet of attack
submarines, led by the relatively new Type 041 Yuan-class diesel-electric guided-missile
submarine, the third of which was launched in May 2008. The Yuan is reputed to be
exceptionally quiet and to be able to employ some of China’s latest wake-homing tor27
pedoes. If so, the Yuan is a potent threat to both surface and subsurface combatants.
Supplementing its three Yuan-class vessels, the PLAN attack submarine fleet includes
thirteen Song-class diesel submarines—another capable attack platform, especially
when operating on its quiet battery system. Indeed, an undetected Song-class submarine surfaced within torpedo range of Kitty Hawk during exercises in the Pacific east of
28
Japan near the island of Okinawa in October 2006. The Chinese also maintain nineteen older, less-capable Ming-class patrol submarines (used largely for coastal patrol)
and seven indigenously built Romeo-class submarines. However, perhaps China’s most
potent diesel attack submarines are its twelve Kilo-class submarines, purchased from
29
Russia between 1995 and 2006. These vessels are reported to be equipped with
enhanced sound quieting and lethal torpedo and antiship missile technology, including
the supersonic SS-N-27 Sizzler antiship cruise missile, reputedly capable of defeating
30
U.S. naval air defenses.
In order to extend the range and sustainability of the PLAN’s already potent diesel
attack submarine fleet, China also maintains a nuclear-powered attack fleet consisting
of two Type 093 Shang-class and four Type 091 Han-class submarines. The Hans are
the result of an indigenous building project during the 1960s and ’70s, although the
31
first was not commissioned until January 1980. However, the PLAN recognized that
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the platform suffers from several design flaws, not the least of which is its excessive
32
noise, which allows potential opponents to track it with relative ease. Accordingly, the
Shang was developed as a follow-on platform, reportedly with Russian assistance in
underwater noise-reduction measures; two of these enhanced nuclear-powered attack
33
submarines were commissioned in 2006 and 2007, respectively.
Rounding out its submarine force, the PLAN maintains two classes of nuclear-powered
ballistic-missile submarines. Although ostensibly designed for a nuclear deterrent role,
the Type 092 Xia, of which China built only one, has to date apparently never ventured
beyond Chinese regional waters. In fact, China’s underwater nuclear deterrent capability was until recently largely theoretical. This is because the Xia, as an older submarine
reportedly based on the design of the Han class, has been beset with technical difficul34
ties, including, predictably, excessively noisy operation. However, the design of
China’s two (or perhaps three) newer Type 094 Jin-class submarines appears to be
based on the Shang hull design and accordingly is assessed as “a dramatic improvement” over the Xia. The Jin’s emergence may therefore mark the beginning of a meaningful Chinese underwater nuclear deterrence program. In any case, China’s submarine
fleet clearly poses a serious challenge to American strategic interests in the East Asian
region, especially the security of the Japanese waters surrounding the many islands that
35
constitute its sovereign territory.

Japanese Geography and the Law of the Sea
One such area of critical strategic importance to Japan comprises its southwest Ryukyu
Islands—collectively Japan’s westernmost outpost, well positioned to protect Japan’s
maritime economic interests in the East China Sea from Chinese encroachment. The
islands of Ishigaki and Miyako lie at approximately 24°30' north latitude between
approximately 124° and 125° east longitude (see figure 3). They are relatively small
islands, situated approximately a hundred nautical miles off the northeast coast of Taiwan and 1,200 nautical miles southwest of Tokyo, and they have a combined land mass
of less than three hundred square miles.
The water between the islands is bisected by tiny Tarama Island, which lies 18.2 nautical miles from Ishigaki Island and just under twenty-four nautical miles from Miyako
36
Island, in waters in which small coral islands and reefs abound. It was through a relatively deepwater trench of Japanese waters between Ishigaki and Tarama that the Han
passed in November 2004. By one account, “there is a V-shaped notch that exists
underwater between Ishigaki and Miyako islands around which there are shallow
waters and complicated narrow terrain in which a sub can easily be grounded. How37
ever, the Chinese sub was found to have sailed through at a high speed.”
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Figure 3. The Ishigaki Strait in the southwesternmost reaches of the Ryukyu island chain runs
between the tiny islands of Ishigaki and Miyako.
Source: U.S. Defense Mapping Agency Chart WOPGN522.
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Under UNCLOS, of which both China and Japan are members, coastal states have the
right to establish sovereignty over adjacent waters out to a maximum of twelve nautical
38
miles from their coastlines, including the coastlines of offshore islands. These
39
enclosed waters are known as the coastal state’s territorial sea. In 1996, the Japanese
government enacted its territorial-sea law, establishing its claim of sovereignty to the
twelve-nautical-mile band of coastal waters around most of its shoreline—including
the Ishigaki, Tarama, and Miyako islands—but claiming a lesser breadth, for strategic
40
reasons, in five other key straits.
In return for the expansion of coastal states’ sovereign control over waters that had formerly been open to use by all states, UNCLOS negotiators ensured that seagoing states
41
would maintain certain rights of access to the newly enclosed waters. For instance,
ships retained the right of innocent passage throughout the expanded territorial seas.
Innocent passage is defined as the continuous and expeditious transit by any vessel of
another state’s territorial sea, for the purpose of passage, in a manner that is “not preju42
dicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.” These broad terms are, of
course, subject to significant variations of interpretation from one coastal state to the
next, but UNCLOS does provide some specificity: without the permission of the
coastal state, collection of intelligence and the conduct of research or survey activities
43
within the territorial sea are express violations of innocent passage. Additionally, submarines exercising innocent passage are required to navigate on the surface and to
44
show their flags.
As mentioned above, another navigation regime, known as “transit passage,” applies
where opposing coastlines are twenty-four nautical miles or less apart and the coastal
states involved (or a single coastal state with sovereignty over both opposing coastlines)
have exercised their right to enclose the waters between the opposing coastlines within
territorial seas of the full legal breadth of twelve nautical miles. An additional requirement for the application of transit passage is that the strait connects “one part of the
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclu45
sive economic zone.” In such waters, known as “international straits,” the territorialsea claims of the coastal state or states overlap or abut and so “close off ” the strait of
water between them, such that no corridor of waters with high seas freedoms remains
46
between the opposing coasts. In international straits, unlike in other parts of the territorial sea, all ships have the right to continuous and expeditious transit in the normal
mode of operation. The normal mode of operation provides ships with much broader
operating rights than in innocent passage and includes the right of submarines to pass
47
through the strait submerged. Since the waters of the Ishigaki Strait between Ishigaki
and Tarama islands connect to areas of high seas freedoms in the exclusive economic
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zone of Japan to the east and west of the islands, the dominant view is that transit passage applies in this strait.48
In addition to the requirement that a strait connect two areas of high seas freedoms,
some states—Japan is one of them—apply additional legal restrictions to further limit
the right of transit passage, which of course has the effect of placing additional limits
49
on the right of submarines to pass through the strait submerged. These countries,
looking to language in UNCLOS specifying that transit passage “applies to straits which
are used for international navigation,” limit the right of transit passage only to those
straits routinely used for international navigation or perhaps necessary for international
navigation, rather than applying it more broadly to all straits capable of use for interna50
tional navigation. Additionally, these countries broadly construe language in
UNCLOS that disallows the application of transit passage in straits where there is a seaward route of “similar convenience” through the coastal state’s exclusive economic zone
51
that does not require passage through the strait. These distinctions are critical in puzzling out the assertive nature of the Japanese response to the presence of a submerged
Chinese submarine in the Ishigaki Strait. The Japanese view is that a route of similar
convenience in international waters applies to the west, between Ishigaki and Taiwan
(see figure 3), making international transit through Japanese waters unnecessary and
thereby nullifying the route between Ishigaki and Miyako as an international strait with
rights of submerged passage for submarines.
The only definitive international law guidance concerning the rights of passage in an
international strait is the 1949 Corfu Channel case, involving a dispute between the
United Kingdom and Albania over the right of British warships to pass unhindered
52
through the narrow waters between the island of Corfu and the Albanian coastline.
The case was the first ever heard before the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
which determined that Albania could not hinder the passage of the British warships
through the Corfu Channel. Using language that is now echoed in UNCLOS, the
court stated that the decisive criteria for the application of international navigational
freedoms through a strait are its “geographical situation as connecting two parts of
the high seas and the fact of its being used for international navigation.” The court
decided that when these two circumstances are present, all ships—including warships
in a nonthreatening posture—have a right to pass as a matter of customary interna53
tional law. However, adding some confusion to its ruling, in determining that the
Corfu Channel was a “useful route for international navigation” the court went on to
detail the routine transit of the channel over several years by ships of various regional
54
states. This detailing of actual use of the strait by the international community had
the effect of giving succor to coastal states that desire to read the law restrictively in
order to limit transit passage access to their less frequently used straits.
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In developing its policy concerning transit passage, the Japanese government apparently took advantage of the opening provided in the Corfu Channel case and reasoned
that only if a strait is routinely used for international navigation should the transit passage regime apply. Accordingly, from Japan’s perspective, since the Ishigaki Strait is not
routinely used for international navigation, the Chinese Han submarine had no right
to claim transit passage and its submerged passage between Ishigaki and Tarama islands
was a violation of Japan’s sovereignty.
Typically, maritime powers favor a broad interpretation of the term “useful route” and
apply a right of transit passage to any qualifying strait “capable of navigation” by any
international shipping, merchant or military, since the widest possible freedom of
action is in the interest of such maritime powers. Contrarily, coastal states with a sense
of vulnerability from the sea naturally favor a much more restrictive view and acknowledge transit passage rights only in the relatively few world straits through which international shipping is routine and for which no other route of similar convenience is
available, such as the straits of Gibraltar and Hormuz.
Japan, though a maritime power, is atypical in this regard. This is because, although the
JMSDF arguably continues to be the most powerful naval force possessed by any Asian
55
state, its use remains constitutionally constrained to defensive purposes. However,
Japan as an island state has widely dispersed territory and maritime interests to defend
and relies on peaceful sea lines of communication for its connection to the global system that sustains the Japanese economy and food supply. Japan fought three major
wars at sea between 1895 and 1945, ultimately with disastrous results, and today its
independence from Chinese domination relies at least in part on the balancing presence of the American fleet and the ability of international law to constrain rising Chinese power. For these reasons, some of Japan’s policies on international law of the sea
reflect the concerns of a vulnerable coastal state rather than the perspectives of a stronger maritime power.
As evidence of Japan’s attempt to avoid a robust international right to transit passage
between its islands, when the Japanese government extended sovereignty over its
coastal waters it took great pains to avoid creating international straits in areas where
transit passage would apply under either the expansive or restrictive definition. In the
five international straits clearly affected by even the restrictive approach—the
Tsushima Strait (in the waters between the southern island of Kyushu and the Korean
Peninsula, depicted in figure 4), the Osumi Strait (between Kyushu and smaller islands
off Kyushu’s southern coast), La Perouse or Soya Strait (the northernmost strait
between Hokkaido and Russia’s Sakhalin Island), and Tsugaru Strait (between
Hokkaido and Honshu)—Japan took the unusual step of limiting its territorial sea
claims to less than twelve nautical miles in order to leave a band of international waters
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with high seas freedoms sufficient for ships to pass without having to rely on the right
56
of transit passage. These are the “high seas corridors” discussed above, and they have
the effect of using international law to force a foreign, potentially hostile submarine to
make a choice: if it desires to exercise high seas freedoms and pass submerged it must
use the narrow midstrait channel away from Japanese shores; if it desires to pass close
to Japanese shores, it must accept vulnerability and abide by the limitations of innocent
passage, sailing on the surface with its national flag flying.
It is worth noting that the United States does not accept the Japanese perspective that
there are only five potential international straits through Japanese territorial waters. As
a state with extensive maritime interests, and for which access to the world’s oceans is
critical to maintaining its national security, the United States has long interpreted
UNCLOS and the Corfu Channel case to mean that transit passage applies in all straits
57
susceptible of international navigation. This is a crucial distinction, in that under the
U.S. definition every strait that connects two areas of high seas freedoms and is
enclosed in territorial waters is fair game for transit passage by American merchant
vessels and warships in their normal modes of operation—including submerged submarines. This vastly increases access to and through the world’s littorals, compared
with the restrictive Japanese views.

Chinese Legal Perspectives
Like the Japanese, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long held the position that
transit passage rights apply in only a very few international straits worldwide, none of
which are in Chinese waters. This view is articulated, for instance, in a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) publication on international law for military officers. This document
says that the category of “straits for international navigation” includes only “those that
straddle important international sea lanes” and that, through historical use or as evidenced by international treaties, have “important implications for the national interests
58
of certain countries.” Indeed, the language of this section of PRC military guidance,
while acknowledging that some straits are “open to international navigation,” glosses
over the UNCLOS right of transit passage and instead emphasizes the importance of
59
coastal state sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters in an international strait.
Additionally, in direct opposition to the clear language of UNCLOS, China’s territorialsea statute specifies that innocent passage throughout the PRC’s territorial seas for the
warships of other states is forbidden without the express permission of the Chinese
60
government. Even China’s accession to UNCLOS is accompanied by a strong statement of coastal state control over territorial waters: attached to its accession documents China included a declaration that highlights its limitations on the right of
61
innocent passage in its territorial sea. Additionally, China’s government officials and
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Figure 4. The Eastern and Western channels of the Tsushima Strait. The Western Channel is
bounded to the northwest by the territorial waters of the Republic of Korea.
Source: Limits in the Seas: No. 120, Straight Baselines and Territorial Sea Claims: Japan.
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scholars have publicly made the case that foreign military activities other than mere
62
passage in or above the exclusive economic zone of another country are unlawful. Perhaps to maintain the government’s freedom of action on the point, China’s relevant
statute simply but ambiguously states that international freedoms of navigation and
overflight in its exclusive economic zone are “subject to international laws and the laws
and regulations of the People’s Republic of China . . . [and to] the historical right that
63
the People’s Republic of China enjoys.”
The submerged passage of the Han could have marked an opportunity for China to signal its ascension to maritime-power status, and the government could have altered its
restrictive policies concerning the right of ships to pass through its own waters. However, despite China’s steady rise as a maritime power with substantial commercial and
military interests at sea, during and after the diplomatic furor over the discovery of the
submerged Han in Japanese waters the PRC remained officially wedded to its restrictive
views on the authority of foreign warships to operate in another state’s coastal zones.
Accordingly, in response to the Japanese demands for a Chinese apology, the Chinese
government had no other alternative than to express official “regret” over the submarine’s intrusion.
Given the international law and policy implications, it is intriguing that the PLAN’s
activities in Japanese waters do not appear to be well coordinated with the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or, by implication, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The PRC’s government’s delay in responding to Japan’s official queries about
the identity of the Han submarine in 2004 and the purpose of its passage is telling.
Having initially denied any knowledge of the developing situation, the PRC’s government remained silent about the incident for five days after reports of the submarine’s
64
presence in Japanese territorial waters were made public. The PRC vice foreign minister eventually met with the Japanese ambassador and declared that the submarine had
been on “routine maneuvers” at the time of the incursion and that it had “accidentally
strayed,” for a “technical reason,” into Japanese territorial waters, for which he
65
“expressed regret.” The five-day delay suggests that the ministry was genuinely
unaware of what the PLAN was doing and suggests that the naval leadership may have
been acting on its own initiative to make an independent point to Japan (and possibly
66
to other organs of the PRC government as well).
China has taken great care to ensure that all of its other naval activities in and around
the Japanese Archipelago have been carried out with sensitivity to the international law
expectations and perspectives of Japan. Accordingly, if the PRC never intended to use
the Han’s passage to signal a shift in its official position on the right of transit passage,
why would the PLAN send an easily detected submerged submarine through waters in
which by China’s own doctrine, legal interpretations, and policy it had no right to be?
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As mentioned above, Han-class submarines are known to be fairly noisy and therefore
easily detectable, and this one passed through Japanese waters at the relatively shallow
67
depth of less than a hundred meters. Additionally, President Hu Jintao and
then–Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi were scheduled to meet for a one-on-one
side-summit after the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum in Chile just days
after the incident; why provoke the Japanese during the important weeks before the
68
meetings? Several possibilities suggest themselves—all of them instructive of the strategic implications of China’s rise as a naval power.

The Strategic Implications of the Han Incident
The Incursion May Indeed Have Been Unauthorized or Due to a “Technical
Reason”
As noted above, the official explanation for the incident was that the submarine was
returning from a routine patrol and blundered through the strait because of poor navigation stemming from a “technical reason.” However, the explanation of navigational
error, although officially accepted by Japan in order to diffuse political tensions, is
implausible on its face. A glance at any chart of these waters makes clear that to pass
through the Ishigaki Strait the Han would have had to be fully seventy-five to a hundred nautical miles off a course that would take it either between the islands of Taiwan
and Ishigaki or into the corridor of water southwest of Okinawa that is beyond the Japanese territorial sea. On the contrary, the JMSDF tracking of the Han indicated it
passed through the strait cleanly, without noticeable navigational difficulty, as if piloted
69
by someone familiar with the waters in that area.
Additionally, all submarines operating in littoral waters use fathometers to measure
depth. In this area there are ample underwater features that, were the submarine seriously off course, would alert the submarine commander to the danger. The applicable
navigation chart, for instance, shows that the distance between the two-thousandmeter and one-thousand-meter depth curves in the region of the strait is substantially
shorter than in other waters through which the submarine might have intended to
pass—the distance between curves is approximately ten nautical miles in the vicinity of
the strait, as opposed to nearly fifty nautical miles elsewhere (see figure 5). This unexpectedly rapid loss of water depth would have caused the commander to suspect that
his plotted position and course were off and would have raised concerns of possible
70
grounding among the islands and their many coral reefs. Had the submarine actually
been concerned about its location or ability to navigate safely, it would have made a
wide course correction well out to sea—certainly before it crossed the thousand-meter
curve, just off Ishigaki Island.

Source: U.S. Defense Mapping Agency, Chart INT 509.

Figure 5. The 1000- through 6000-meter curves are depicted. The wide variation in the seabed gradient east and west of the Ishigaki Strait would have
alerted a submarine navigator that the vessel was off course well before it reached the channel.
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Clearly, therefore, the PRC story about navigational error and technical difficulties was
a face-saving cover. Other, more likely, reasons for the submarine’s decision to make
passage through the Ishigaki Strait have both legal and strategic significance.
Scouting: The Action Could Have Been a Covert Mapping Exercise
For years the United States has been aware that the PLAN has been exploring various
submarine routes through which to move its submarines into the central Pacific in the
71
event of regional conflict. Some observers have suggested that relaxations in trade and
technology restrictions in the 1990s allowed China to purchase advanced oceano72
graphic mapping systems that enable it to make sophisticated maps of the ocean floor.
These maps could be very useful to the PRC submarine force in the event of war. Additionally, the maps could be useful in exploring the seabed for suitable locations to drill
and explore for gas and oil. On these bases, some have suggested that the Han’s passage
was the latest excursion in a sustained effort to map the seafloor in the East China Sea
and the approaches to it.
If the submarine was in fact collecting intelligence, mapping Japanese territorial waters
without Japan’s permission, or performing economic research in a disputed area, the
PRC has some explaining to do. UNCLOS provides that “coastal states, in the exercise
of their sovereignty, have the exclusive right to regulate, authorize and conduct marine
73
scientific research in their territorial sea.” Furthermore, UNCLOS provides that “during transit passage, foreign ships . . . may not carry out any research or survey activities
74
without the prior consent of the coastal State,” including hydrographic surveys.
UNCLOS takes an equally stern stance regarding intelligence collection activities during either innocent passage or transit passage. Concerning innocent passage, UNCLOS
provides that “passage of a foreign ship shall be considered prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security of the coastal state if in the territorial sea it engages in any act
aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense of the coastal state or
75
the carrying out of research or survey activities.” UNCLOS extends these prohibitions
to the territorial waters covered by international straits, stating that “any activity which
is not an exercise of the right of transit passage through a strait remains subject to the
76
other applicable provisions of the Convention.”
Indeed, China itself gets rather prickly over just this issue—even in waters well away
from its territorial sea, as its legal perspectives on foreign military activities in the
exclusive economic zones of other states demonstrate. In March 2000 and again in September 2002, PLAN warships directed the USNS Bowditch—an unarmed oceanographic research vessel manned by twenty-five civilians—to exit an area in China’s
exclusive economic zone in the Yellow Sea, well outside Chinese territorial waters, in
77
which the ship had been performing hydrographic performance acoustic data tests.
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Such tests are performed using sonarlike equipment to determine the salinity, temperature, existence of currents, and other water characteristics that affect the movement of
sound under the surface. The collected data is useful in tracking submarines, but it is
just as useful to submarines intent on avoiding detection. While these tests would have
been contrary to international law if performed in China’s territorial sea, the waters in
which the tests were being performed were within the PRC exclusive economic zone,
where international law provides all states the right to exercise high seas freedoms,
including conducting scientific research, such as hydrographic surveys, not related to
78
the natural resources of the zone. China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman at the time
refused to specify her country’s specific basis for requiring Bowditch to depart, citing
only her state’s “relevant rights” in the exclusive economic zone as a basis for the
79
PLAN’s actions.
Thus, comparing the two incidents, if indeed the Han’s passage through the Ishigaki
Strait was for the purpose of collecting hydrographic or intelligence data, China’s decision to send a submarine submerged through Japan’s territorial waters is especially surprising. That is, the submarine performed in the sovereign waters of Japan activities
that by its own interpretation of international law China does not countenance even in
the nonsovereign waters of its exclusive economic zone, much farther from China’s
own shores.
International law does not leave states without legitimate remedies for true violations.
UNCLOS provides that a coastal state has the right to “take the necessary steps in its
80
territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent.” It also specifies that coastal
states discovering warships in noncompliance with coastal-state laws and regulations
concerning passage through the territorial sea can request that the ship come into compliance; if the ship does not, the coastal state may require it to leave the territorial sea
81
immediately. Additionally, the right of diplomatic protest preserves the coastal state’s
position on the state of the law. These remedies must, of course, be interpreted in light
of the coastal state’s right to use force in self-defense in response to an armed attack,
but the clear intent of international law as reflected in UNCLOS is to avoid escalatory
82
actions by coastal states toward nonhostile warships in their waters.
Put in this light, the JMSDF’s tracking activities were a proportionate and legitimate
response to what the Japanese government perceived was a Chinese violation of Japan’s
maritime sovereignty. Additionally, the submerged passage of the Han through the
Ishigaki Strait, where it stood a reasonable chance of being detected by the Japanese,
was counterproductive to the PRC’s efforts to gain acceptance for its position that a
coastal state has “relevant rights” that it may enforce by excluding others from information gathering in the exclusive economic zone off its coasts. Further, since state
practice is a primary source of international law, if China’s purpose for this Han was to
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gather intelligence about the waters and seabed in the Ishigaki Strait, its own naval
practices have defeated China’s larger strategic purpose of advancing and shaping the
law in favor of coastal-state control over foreign military and research activities in their
coastal waters.
Signaling: The PLAN May Have Been Demonstrating Its Sea Power
It is conceivable that the submarine’s submerged passage through Japanese waters was
an intentional provocation to demonstrate to Japan and the United States the extent of
the PRC’s sea power and its blue-water capability, and possibly to test the military
83
capabilities of the Japanese. To the United States, China’s message has consistently
84
been that it should refrain from military support for Taiwan. To Japan, China’s message may be related to ongoing maritime boundary and resource disputes, making the
Han incident one among the string of such messages over the past decade designed to
85
demonstrate China’s growing naval power.
For instance, in addition to the incidents listed in table 1, China increased its fleet
activity significantly in the international waters within the Japanese exclusive economic
zone in the East China Sea in the year before the Han incident. The submarine’s passage through that area was reportedly the thirty-fourth such instance in 2004, up from
86
only seven in 2003. This increase could be attributed to a number of factors, including
the need for new and deeper operations areas as the PRC submarine fleet’s deepwater
capabilities improved. However, the most plausible explanation is that China is using
its navy to signal its growing ability to resolve military disputes in its favor if neighbors
87
or competitors should consider resorting to force.
One of the reasons China may have taken this particular opportunity to demonstrate
its naval capabilities may have been to strengthen its negotiating position in its dispute
with Japan over delimitation of their respective exclusive economic zones in the East
China Sea. The Han incursion occurred during a period of tense disagreement between
China and Japan over the PRC’s gas exploration projects bordering an area in the East
88
China Sea that Japan claims as its exclusive economic zone. Japan protests the existing
Chinese gas fields because of concern that wells so near the median line will inevitably
take natural gas from the Japanese side should the median line form the basis for an
89
eventual maritime boundary. After the submarine passed out of the Ishigaki Strait, it
was tracked near the Chinese offshore gas projects, which remain controversial notwithstanding a June 2008 agreement between China and Japan to explore jointly a very
small portion of the disputed zone and allowing Japanese companies to participate in
90
Chinese extractions of natural gas from at least one disputed site.
In the days just after the Han’s passage through this sensitive region, Japan’s trade minister openly questioned whether the presence of the sub in those waters was meant by
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the PRC as a not-so-veiled signal.91 This is entirely plausible, given that these waters
remain a cyclical source of tension between China and Japan. For instance, and though
relations have more recently been on the mend, in September 2005 a group of five
PLAN ships was spotted operating for the first time in the area of the Chun Xiao gas
field, which is situated near the border of the disputed area of the exclusive economic
92
zones between China and Japan. In order to make sure the message was clearly understood, one of the Chinese ships reportedly aimed its 100 mm bow gun at a JMSDF
P-3C patrol plane and maintained a track as the aircraft patrolled in international airspace.93 During this period, such acts of intimidation were meant to reinforce China’s
claim to the resources under the entire continental shelf and to “encourage” Japan not
to interfere with operation of the Chinese gas field, which is only about two kilometers
94
from the boundary of the Japanese-claimed exclusive economic zone.
Gatekeeping: Access and Antiaccess during an East Asian Crisis
In a military crisis over the status of Taiwan, one role for China’s potent submarine
force would be to support a PRC blockade of the island and to prevent the United
States and Japan from using the choke points created by Japanese islands to deny Chinese vessels access to and from the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea during the
95
period of crisis.
The Chinese are aware, for instance, of blockading exercises held by the JMSDF in 1983
in the narrow Suo Nada Sea, east of the islands of Honshu and Kyushu. During those
exercises the JMSDF reportedly laid dummy mines to simulate a strait closure, demonstrating the capability to prevent hostile submarines from passing through the Japanese
96
islands to the Pacific and from returning home for resupply. One Chinese military
scholar more recently observed, “The Sakishima Islands and the Ryukyu Islands . . . are
the Pacific gateway for the exit and entry of China’s North Sea Fleet and East Sea
97
Fleet.” Viewing Japanese control of the ring of islands between the Asian continent
and the open Pacific Ocean, another observer noted that “the geographic conditions
arising from the westward extension of the Japanese islands also confers to this ‘aircraft
carrier’ a combat range that virtually covers . . . all of China’s oceanic exits and sea lines
98
of communication.” This condition has caused other Chinese military observers to
note, “At the strategic level, the westward and southward emphasis of Japan’s maritime
99
expansion could contain China’s march to the ocean.” Avoiding such a “trap” during
times of crisis would require PLAN commanders to have detailed knowledge of alternative undersea routes in and out of the region.
Alternatively, in preparation for the possibility that the PLAN may itself have to use its
submarine force to block Japan or the United States from supporting Taiwan, it is possible that the PLAN sent the Han through sensitive Japanese waters in order to test the
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strength of JMSDF ASW operations.100 Such probing could help the PLAN to understand better the capacity of Japanese ASW forces to prevent Chinese submarines from
slipping through Japan’s island “gates” into the Pacific to meet a U.S. fleet during a crisis in the East Asian littorals. The slow speed and erratic course of the submarine as it
passed through Japanese waters north of the strait certainly suggest that it was in fact
testing the JMSDF patrol and tracking capabilities.101
Ironically, similarly to its stance against research and intelligence-gathering activities
without coastal state consent, the PRC has expressed a clear and consistent policy that
innocent passage within the territorial waters of a coastal state is not a matter of right
for warships. Article 6 of the Territorial Waters and Adjoining Areas Act of the People’s
Republic of China authorizes merchant vessels to exercise the right of innocent passage
through Chinese waters without prior permission but specifically requires foreign military vessels to seek permission of the Chinese government before entering territorial
102
waters. Thus, in addition to weakening Chinese ability to limit research and intelligence gathering off its coasts, the passage of the Han through the Ishigaki Strait without Japan’s consent also undermined China’s efforts to shape international law in favor
of a coastal state’s authority to prohibit the movement of warships in the territorial
seas off its coasts.
In light of the political tensions in the East China Sea and China’s strict stance regarding passage by warships into its own territorial waters, the Japanese obviously followed
the Han’s path with particular interest. In fact, some sources reported that the PRC
submarine was initially detected leaving its home port, either by an American satellite
or through Taiwanese intelligence channels, then tracked by a U.S. Navy submarine and
103
P-3C patrol planes off Guam. The submarine continued to be tracked for more than
four days south of the Ryukyus near the politically sensitive Japanese Okinotori Island.
The Japanese stepped up monitoring as the submarine passed through its territorial
104
waters in the ocean trench between Ishigaki and Miyako on its return trip.
That the Han submarine was operating off Guam before it transited north through the
Ishigaki Strait is of particular interest to the United States, because the Han’s noisy
movement through waters east of Taiwan and the Japanese island chain was another
open demonstration that the PLAN is able to operate outside what it calls the “first
defensive island chain” into the waters of the outer defensive perimeter, or “second
island chain” (see figure 6). These island chains are perceived ideally as defensive
spheres within which the PLAN must achieve sea supremacy to deny the United States
105
and its allies freedom of action should armed conflict over Taiwan erupt. However, to
use the water space within the first island chain as a defensive sphere the PLAN must
prevent the island chain from becoming a wall inhibiting the freedom of action of its
own vessels. This obviously requires the PLAN in times of crisis to get its submarines
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Figure 6. The first island chain runs southward from the Kurils through the Japanese
Archipelago and the Ryukyu island chain, east of Taiwan, through the Philippine Archipelago,
westward through the Indonesian Archipelago before curving northward to the Indochinese
Peninsula. The second island chain runs south from Japan through Micronesia and
southwestward to the island of New Guinea.
Source: Ye Xinrong and Zuo Liping, “On the Strategic Thinking of the Navy of the People’s Liberation Army
Moving from Offshore Operations to Open-Ocean Operations,” p. 30.

SCOUTING, SIGNALING, AND GATEKEEPING

25

quickly through the island chain to the blue-water operating areas beyond. Otherwise,
China will have committed the critical strategic mistake of allowing naval forces to be
trapped in coastal waters and rendered useless during conflict, as occurred when Japan
systematically destroyed a strong Chinese naval force in coastal battles during the
106
1894–95 Sino-Japanese War.
One pair of Chinese strategic thinkers from the Chinese Naval Research Institute of the
People’s Liberation Army Navy articulated the strategic imperative to operate between
the first and second island chains as follows:
If we develop some weapons and equipment suitable for open-ocean operations in a
planned manner and enable the PLAN to possess a certain open-ocean operational capability and comprehensive domination power, we can then deploy offensive operations and
sabotage operations outside the first island chain and on the broad maritime battlefield,
and this will effectively deter our enemy. Looking at the strategic situation, China’s sea area
is semi-enclosed, and its exit into the Pacific Ocean is controlled by others. If the motherland’s reunification issue can be solved smoothly, we will have an ideal exit to the sea. . . .
However, we cannot sit around and wait until the motherland’s reunification issue is resolved before we move toward the open ocean, but rather, we should . . . break through the
bonds of the island chain, actively build up open-ocean operational strength, and strive to
raise our operational capability in the sea area outside the island chain.107

Not surprisingly, therefore, there has been a gradual increase in PLAN missions into
waters disputed by China and Japan in the East China Sea, and now into Japanese
waters themselves. As these Chinese strategists suggest, the mounting military activities
may be part of an effort to deter intervention in a cross-strait scenario—perhaps most
especially attempts to block the exits needed by Chinese naval vessels to reach the open
ocean. Additionally, these incursions may be signals that China considers its navy to
possess both the technology and operational ability to disrupt any efforts the United
States and Japan might undertake on Taiwan’s behalf. Under either scenario, the
increased Chinese naval activity deserves the careful attention of the Japanese and
American security communities.

Conclusions
The overall status and interpretation of the international law relevant to the right of all
vessels of all states to pass through international straits remain unchanged as a result of
Chinese naval operations in and around the choke points in the Japanese Archipelago,
including the Han’s passage through the Ishigaki Strait. Both China and Japan continue
to challenge the prevailing understanding that international straits include all “useful
routes” for international navigation, and each seeks to establish the position that only
straits that are “necessary routes” for international navigation qualify as international
straits.
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Additionally, despite the fact that the Han’s submerged passage through the Ishigaki
Strait represents a direct contradiction to China’s clearly and repeatedly expressed position that foreign naval vessels may not enter another country’s territorial sea without
consent, and that even when consent is given submarines must be on the surface and
flying their flags, China did not alter its official legal policies on these points. Only if
China had followed the Han’s underwater passage through the Ishigaki Strait with a
political assertion that the submarine had an international-law right to do so, rather
than expressing regret about the alleged navigational and technical errors, would the
passage have qualified as the sort of state conduct on which changes in international
law perspectives are based.
But in at least one sense the landscape of international law has changed nonetheless.
The Chinese spent at least a decade prior to the 2004 incident attempting to build the
case for increased jurisdiction and control of coastal states over the maritime zones off
their shores. By preventing Bowditch’s survey activities in their exclusive economic
zone, for instance, the Chinese staked a position consistent with coastal-state control.
However, with one submarine’s submerged passage through a neighbor’s territorial sea
in a manner that could not plausibly have been accidental, the Chinese undercut the
legitimacy of their restrictive position on international law of the sea. This could have a
profound effect on the development of international law of the sea as a whole. At a
minimum, it strengthens the hand of those states, such as the United States, that recognize international law as imposing only minimal restrictions on the freedom of maritime navigation. Certainly, this incident will serve as a benchmark when in the future
states seek to interpret acceptable practices in the coastal zones of other states in light
of international law of the sea. Thus, whether the Chinese navy was undertaking in this
incident a scouting expedition to map covertly the seabed through the strait, signaling
the extent of its modern sea power, or testing continental Asia’s gates to the open ocean
by exploring Japanese antisubmarine detection and response capabilities, the Chinese
may have lost more than they gained. If the PLAN gathered some new knowledge of
the underwater avenue through the strait, it made a short-term tactical gain. However,
it did so at the price of a significant loss in the credibility of its advocacy against routine U.S. military operations off its own coasts.
In sharp contrast, Japan quickly saw a strategic opportunity to put the Chinese on the
defensive and took advantage of it. The Japanese forced the Chinese to express public
regret over the incident and thereby strengthened their own strategic position that Chinese submarines have no right to pass submerged through those waters. By choosing to
pursue the submarine actively rather than relying solely on the de-escalatory measures
contemplated by UNCLOS, Japan clearly signaled to China that it is willing to flex mili108
tary muscles of its own. Japan strengthened its strategic position by demonstrating
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the ability to respond quickly to an emergent crisis, grasp strategic opportunity, and
take bold action.
In any event, China’s increasingly modern submarine fleet is a force that deserves
respect. It is well designed to support the PLA’s antiaccess strategy and to support the
interests of the national leadership in signaling China’s arrival as a maritime power.
Additionally, as they scout the depths of the strategic narrows that form the gates in
Asia’s wall of littoral islands, Chinese naval commanders are gaining valuable insights
into the most effective means to close off their coastal seas from outside interference.
And yet, taken as a whole, Chinese naval operations in Japanese waters reveal an underlying tension between China’s advancing naval capabilities and its protective perspectives on international law of the sea. It remains to be seen whether China’s next step
will be to align its policies on international law of the sea with its growing maritime
capabilities. Perhaps the recent Chinese decision to send a small flotilla to join the
antipiracy operations off the coast of Somalia is the first signal that China’s perspectives on international law of the sea will soon be coming into greater alignment with its
109
interests as a rising maritime power. China’s insistence on gaining formal Somali
consent for its antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, however, suggests the opposite. Either way, the growing Chinese naval presence in and around the Japanese Archipelago has made clear that the Chinese navy sees its submarine fleet as an important
deterrent to American and Japanese military intervention during an East Asian crisis,
and as long as such deterrence remains a strategic priority for China, its policies on law
of the sea will continue to be focused on delegitimizing U.S. naval presence in East
Asian waters. That such policies also limit the activities of China’s growing fleet must
then be accepted as the cost of pursuing its antiaccess objectives.
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